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Abstract 
This paper investigates the ownership of academic patents for a sample of UK academics and 
challenges the existing definition of the university invention ownership model. The first descriptive 
results show that 50% of patents are owned by industry, however, 37% of these firm-assigned patents 
are in fact owned by university spin-offs. We investigate how university policy and funding 
acquisition impacts industry vs. university ownership, and find that funding from large firms predicts 
involvement in patenting and, to a lesser extent, firm ownership. University ownership of academic 
patents is more likely the higher the amount of funding coming from SMEs, and at universities that 
outsource the filing of patents. Spin-off patents occupy an intermediate position showing strong 
similarities to both firm and university patents. 
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1 Introduction 
The appropriation of academic intellectual property (IP) has been encouraged by policy 
makers over the past 30 years to foster technology transfer from universities to industry and 
to enable the commercialisation of academic research. One objective behind the increased 
incentives is the prospective additional income it may provide to universities. Another benefit 
is its potential to increase the efficiency of technology transfer by allowing non-exclusive 
licenses, by enabling wider use of an invention and by allowing for a better search strategy 
that ensures the commercialisation of the invention and thus providing wider socio-economic 
benefits (see Crespi et al. (2010) for a review).1  
However, previous work has shown that in Europe a large proportion of inventions patented 
by academic researchers are not owned by the university but by private firms (Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006; Lissoni et al., 2008). Researchers and funding partners are able to claim rights 
over inventions due to existing appropriation norms and due to universities’ difficulties in 
handling IP rights (IPR) (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). Changes in legislation and the continuing 
efforts of universities have led to a more rigid IPR regime for academic staff, but even now 
the majority of university inventions are not assigned to the academic institution. Patents left 
with the university are often those in need of more investment and little to no immediate 
returns (Thursby et al., 2009; Czarnitzki et al., 2012; Sterzi, 2013).  
To date there have been few studies that attempt to explain the ownership of academic 
patents, other than those based on characteristics of the invention or national policy. Though 
it has been hypothesised that firms sponsoring academic research may seek ownership of any 
resulting inventions, these links have not as yet been investigated. Further, the large body of 
 
1
 Kenney and Patton (2009) question the efficiency of this university ownership model that has made 
universities to “revenue maximizers, rather than facilitators of technology dissemination for the good of the 
entire society” (p. 1407). 
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literature on academic spin-offs has not been incorporated into the discussion on ownership 
of academic patents. Markman et al. (2008) show that in the US firm ownership is more 
common in universities with a large number of academic spin-offs; firm ownership may thus 
suggest a different type of university ownership model that includes patents assigned to 
university spin-offs rather than a non-university ownership model as is commonly argued. 
Using data from a sample of engineering academics at thirteen UK universities this paper 
therefore aims to investigate the effect of industry involvement and university spin-off policy 
on the ownership of academic patents considering an academic’s selection into patenting.  
2 Academic Patenting and Ownership 
2.1 University versus Industry Ownership 
Starting with the Bayh-Dole act in the US, several countries have moved to actively pursue 
the protection of IP arising from university research. For many years it was believed that 
universities in Europe were lagging behind, as the number of university owned patents in 
Europe is much lower than in the US. However, recent research on university patenting in 
Europe has revealed a much larger involvement in patenting that does not follow the US 
model of university ownership but had flourished under non-university ownership models, 
e.g. professor’s privilege (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Lissoni et al. (2008) find that in some 
countries in Europe only 4% of academic patents are assigned to universities while up to 80% 
of academic inventions are owned by firms. Even for the US, Thursby et al. (2009) and 
Markman et al. (2008) report that approximately one third of patents are not owned by 
universities. These shares are lower than those found for Europe, but highlight the existence 
of different ownership models even in the US. 
The UK occupies a position between the US and the rest of Europe in terms of patent 
ownership. Traditionally universities have been involved in the management of IP. In 1948 
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the National Research Development Agency (later British Technology Group) was formed to 
commercialise inventions resulting from publicly funded research and the 1977 Patent Act 
specifically states that employee inventions belong to the employer (the university) which 
resulted in a move towards a university ownership model. Accordingly, the share of 
university owned inventions is much higher than compared to the rest of Europe (40% share) 
however, industry ownership remains at 50% (Sterzi, 2013). 
Thus the question remains as to what drives industry ownership in countries with an 
established university ownership model. One explanation that has been brought forward is 
that of firm-sponsored academic research. The university and the sponsoring firm may agree 
that any IP resulting from joint research projects are assigned to both the university and the 
firm or solely to the firm (Verspagen, 2006). Knowledge of such collaboration agreements is 
limited and there has been little empirical evidence confirming the link between sponsorship 
and patent ownership. Several papers have shown that collaboration with industry and other 
applied sponsors may help overcome the barrier between scientific and commercial activities 
and that contact with pro-commercialisation sponsors positively affects a researcher’s attitude 
towards patenting as well as her ability to recognise commercial opportunities (Owen-Smith 
and Powell, 2001; Stuart and Ding, 2006). Further, Colyvas and Powell (2006), looking at 
technology transfer activities at Stanford University, observe that technology transfer offices 
(TTOs) and researchers see industry sponsors as potential partners for patenting activities. 
Indeed, in a survey by Lee (2000) both firms and academics report that joint research led to 
patentable outcomes or benefits in developing new patents. Accordingly, Hottenrott and 
Thorwarth (2011) in a survey of German professors investigate the potential effect of 
industry sponsorship on patenting and find a positive correlation. Lawson (2013), using a 12 
year panel of academics from ten universities in the UK, also find a positive effect of industry 
funding on patenting regardless of ownership. This indicates that firm sponsorship 
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encourages patenting in general but not a specific ownership model. The paper, however, 
does not consider selection into patenting and may therefore not find a differential effect on 
the two ownership regimes.  
Additionally we could expect a different effect for funding coming from small as opposed to 
large firms. Firm innovation literature has shown that large firms are more likely to benefit 
from joint research with universities (Cohen et al., 2002; Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003). The 
same may be true for academics working with these large firms. We may further expect a 
different effect for ownership as large firms may be better placed to bargain over ownership 
rights than small firms. Hottenrott and Lawson (2013) differ between contacts to small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs) as opposed to large firms and find that contact with SMEs better 
explains patenting rates of German professors. This may be indicative of better support for 
the university ownership model from SMEs.  
2.2 Spin-off Ownership 
Several papers have investigated university spin-off formation and its role for technology 
transfer (e.g. Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Stuart and Ding, 2006; Clarysse et al., 2011; Fini 
et al., 2011). It has been shown that many university inventions result in spin-offs in which 
the university holds equity. This new company facilitates the commercialisation of the new 
invention and enables the acquisition of additional funding for commercialisation. Inventions 
that result in such spin-offs have been described as less basic (Thursby et al., 2009), and may 
thus be more likely to create immediate financial returns.  
The university ownership model could therefore be further extended to include patents owned 
by university spin-offs. While firms that constitute university spin-offs are relatively easy to 
identify, only Thursby et al. (2009) have provided some statistics on the extent of academic 
patents owned by spin-offs. They report that 32% of all industry owned patents in the US are 
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owned by companies associated to academics and that these are of higher quality than 
academic patents owned by industry or private firms. Also Markman et al. (2008) find some 
evidence that researchers at universities with a higher number of spin-off companies are more 
likely to file a patent that is owned by a firm or an individual. They assume, however, that 
such spin-offs are initiated by the academics, concluding that it presents a way to bypass 
university administration.  
Instead, these spin-off companies could represent a deliberate commercialisation strategy of 
the university. Particularly in the UK, spin-off formation has been a preferred 
commercialisation strategy for universities.2 We can therefore expect that universities with an 
entrepreneurial strategy, i.e. with a larger number of spin-offs, are more likely to follow this 
alternative university ownership model and seemingly file more patents with industry. 
 
To summarise, we add to existing studies by looking at a different definition of the university 
ownership model that allows for university and spin-off owned patents. We investigate how 
university policy and funding acquisition of academics impacts industry vs. university 
ownership to test the hypothesis that industry-funded research is more likely to result in 
industry owned patents. Finally, the UK as a country with a long history of university 
ownership directives but different IP strategies and/or insufficient enforcement provides a 
good example of a case study on drivers of patent ownership.3 
 
2
 Though US universities are more successful in licensing, UK universities create relatively more spin-off 
companies (HEFCE, 2011). 
3
 Universities follow different strategies in managing IP. Some offices may only patent the most promising 
inventions (Meyer and Tang, 2007), while others may prefer to invest in spin-offs or choose not to enforce their 
rights (Markman et al., 2008). 
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3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Data  
We create a novel dataset of tenured engineering academics who were employed at thirteen 
UK universities 4  during the period 2001-2008. Initially, all engineering academics were 
identified using staff registers in academic calendars and on university websites. 5  The 
population contains 744 academics. For each academic in the dataset, patent applications 
stating her as an inventor were collected from esp@cenet (the European Patent Office (EPO) 
web-interface). The web-interface allows searches for patent applications filed with the EPO, 
the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), the US patent office (USPTO) and other 
national patent offices. We consider here all patent applications that state the researcher as an 
inventor and hence not only applications filed by the university but also those assigned to 
third parties, including industry. Data construction required a manual search in the inventor 
database to identify those entries where the identity of the academic was certain.6 As each 
invention can lead to multiple patent applications (e.g. at different patent offices), we 
additionally verified each entry with the Derwent World Patents Index (DWPI) that contains 
information grouped around a patent family, enabling us to uniquely identify the original 
invention and avoid multiple counts. In the remainder of the paper the term patent will refer 
to patent families grouped around an original priority patent (as defined in DWPI) and not to 
individual patents or patent applications. We collected patents filed between 1998 and 2008 
and use the first three years (1998-2000) to build pre-observation measures of patent counts 
 
4
 For a list of universities see Supplement S1. 
5
 For a detailed description of the original data see Banal-Estanol et al. (2010). See Lawson (2013) for an 
analysis of sample distribution differences between the original data and a sub-sample of researchers at 10 UK 
universities, which partially overlaps with the data used in this paper. 
*The full process of extracting and cleaning the data is described in Meissner (2011).
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for our empirical models7 (see section 3.2). All descriptive statistics in this data section are 
based on the sample period 2001-2008 during which all 744 academics were employed at one 
of the thirteen institutions considered in this analysis. Of the 744 researchers, 176 file at least 
one patent during the period 2001-2008 (corresponding to 23%) and the total number of 
patents is 456. We identified the applicant on each patent. If a patent family has more than 
one patent we consider the assignees of the original (first) application.8 We differ between 
patents assigned to a university, a firm, the government or an individual. In this sample, 219 
patents (48%) are owned by universities and 226 patents (50%) are assigned to private firms, 
shares equivalent to the ones found in Sterzi (2013). We collected information for each of the 
firm assignees from FAME9. We then identified those companies that were spun out from 
universities. This was done by consulting the FAME company reports and company 
webpages as well as browsing the websites of universities for lists of spin-offs. Patents are 
owned by 114 different companies of which 54 are large firms with more than 249 employees 
and 31 are university spin-off companies. The remaining 29 firms are SMEs. More 
interestingly, while only about 27% of all firm applicants are university spin-offs, they 
account for 37% of all firm-assigned patents (83 patents). This share is similar to the one 
found by Thursby et al. (2009) for US patents. Large firms account for another 47% (106 
patents). This is in line with previous literature that showed that large firms and start-ups are 
more likely to engage in and benefit from collaborations with universities (Cohen et al., 2002; 
Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003).  
 
7
 We do not have information on workplaces for all academics during the period 1998-2000 and therefore 
cannot make inferences on whether patents are academic patents or not. 
&Ownership can change across time and across patent offices. In the case of regional sister patents, ownership 
can differ from that of the original application. This is ignored, as this extension happened at a later date. Even if 
we consider ownership on all sister patents across time only 15 patents are ‘co-assigned’ to different types of 
agents. This low number is partly due to the short time window with most applications not having entered 
regional stages at the time of data collection.
9
 FAME is a company information register for the UK. 
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To complement the database we collect funding histories of academics. Funding information 
for the period 2001-2007 for each academic was provided by the research offices of the 
thirteen universities. They include names of principal investigators (PIs), funding periods, 
funding amounts and the exact names of sponsoring agents. Funding from industry accounts 
for 20% of total external funding and 453 researchers are PIs on at least one grant during the 
period 2001-2007. The other 80% of research grants come from public sources, including 
research councils and EU. 278 researchers received at least one grant from industry; in total 
984 grants came from 402 different companies. This confirms that industry links through 
research funding partnerships are far more widespread than industry links through patents 
(Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Cohen et al., 2002). The firms were identified on FAME and 
classified as SMEs or large firms (>249 employees).10 In our sample 212 sponsoring firms 
are SMEs and contribute 326 grants; 190 firms are large firms with 645 grants. We observe 
funding from 2001 to 2007 and expect the stock in previous years to reflect a researcher’s 
current research profile and thus patents. In other words, we use the stock of funding between 
2001 and t-1 to predict the ownership of patents filed in t. The total amount of funding 
received from SMEs (sme_funding), large firms (largefirm_funding) and public sponsors 
(public_funding) are considered.  
To measure the appropriation strategy of the university, we use information from the Higher 
Education and Business and Community Interaction (HE-BCI) Survey that since 2003 has 
surveyed universities about their external business related activities. The survey provides 
detailed information about spin-off and patenting activities at the university level. Markman 
et al. (2008) found that spin-off numbers correlate positively with industry ownership. We 
therefore include the number of active spin-offs in t-1 that have survived for at least three 
 
10
 We identified university spin-offs but they were only responsible for 20 grants during the observation period. 
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years (#spinoff) as a proxy for universities’ spin-off policy. Due to the skewed nature of the 
measure we take its log in the regressions. Universities in our sample have between zero and 
46 active spin-offs in 2007/08 (see Supplement S1). Markman et al. (2008) further observed 
that a for-profit TTO correlates positively with university ownership. Thus, the university’s 
organisation of IP activities may affect ownership. We include a dummy that measures 
whether the university outsources filing of its patents (patent_outsourcing), as a measure for 
IP policy at the university level.11 The measure is constant throughout the observation period 
and eight universities outsource their IP activities (see Supplement S1). 
Several additional measures have been shown to affect the researcher’s propensity to engage 
in patenting. Amongst these we consider age at the time of invention as measured in terms of 
years since PhD, its quadratic term, whether a researcher is female, seniority of the researcher 
(being a professor (prof)) and PhD subject area (chemical (chem), electrical and electronic 
(elec), and mechanical and civil engineering (mech_civ)), all of which have been identified as 
important predictors for academic productivity, including patenting (e.g. Stephan et al., 2007). 
They are therefore included in a first stage regression, determining a researcher’s selection 
into patenting. Personal information could be collected for 687 academics.12  
Previous literature has further shown a positive correlation between publications in scientific 
journals and patenting (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2007; Stephan et al., 2007; Fabrizio and DiMinin, 
2008). We therefore also include a publication measure into the selection equation. Research 
activity measured as the average number of publications (avg_publications) published 
between 2001 and t-1 should capture the researcher’s capability to produce innovative 
 
11
 Other measures are not available or do not differ across institutions. For example, several papers have found 
that revenue incentives paid by universities increase disclosure activity of academic staff (Jensen and Thursby, 
2001; Lach and Schankerman, 2008). However, revenue shares in the UK typically follow a structured system 
with lower returns for higher licensing amounts and are similar across universities. Therefore, we do not include 
them into the regression. Also, Markman et al. (2008) find no significant effect of licensing shares on university 
ownership when including other university characteristics. 
Information was taken from personal websites or Index to Theses, a listing of theses accepted for 
higher degrees in the UK and Ireland.
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research. It should however not impact ownership as for example Thursby et al. (2009) do not 
find a significant effect of department quality on patent ownership. Publications were 
collected from the Web of Science for the years 2001-2007 and cleaned manually. 
Previous papers on ownership have primarily used patent characteristics like number of 
claims or citation counts as explanatory variables (Markman et al, 2008; Thursby et al., 
2009); however, these are affected by ownership and by the norms of the respective patent 
office and are therefore not considered here.13 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Selection Model (3278) Uncensored Model (267) 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Dependent Variables   
Patent
 
0.08 0.27 1 1 
University   0.45 0.50 
Firm   0.51 0.50 
Non-spin-off   0.31 0.46 
Spin-off   0.20 0.40 
University/Spin-off   0.65 0.48 
Institutional characteristics   
ln_#spinoff 2.29 1.03 2.72 0.88 
patent_outsourcing 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44 
Funding (in £100.000)     
sme_funding 0.20 1.15 0.59 2.29 
largefirm_funding 0.62 3.36 2.58 7.85 
public_funding 3.42 10.14 6.77 14.60 
Other Variables     
ln_prepat 0.08 0.35 0.54 0.81 
d_prepat 0.87 0.34 0.51 0.50 
age 20.45 10.96 20.48 9.46 
Selection Variables     
avg_publication 1.72 2.46 3.75 4.33 
female 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 
prof 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.48 
elec 0.38 0.48 0.62 0.48 
mech_civ 0.32 0.47 0.11 0.32 
 
 
13
 Most patents in our data are still being examined and have not as yet entered regional phase (in case of Patent 
Cooperation Treaty patents), which further makes the use of patent-based measures problematic. Only 44 
patents had been granted when the data was collected in 2012, either at the EPO (14) or at a regional office and 
only 2 EPO patents had received any citations. 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and for the reduced sample of patent 
events. Supplement S1 contains some additional information on the composition of the 
sample by university. A full definition of all variables and correlation tables for the main 
variables can be found in Supplements S2 and S3, respectively.  
Only patents filed between 2004 and 2008 are considered in the regressions to be able to 
build reliable measures of all explanatory variables. The number of patents is reduced to 
26714 due to missing values in some of the estimators and a reduced observation period. 45% 
of these patents are owned by the university, 20% by university spin-offs and 31% by firms. 
3% are in co-ownership between universities and private firms. The remaining 7% are owned 
by individuals or government.  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
Our main interest is patent ownership, which can be the university, a university spin-off, a 
firm, or a combination thereof.15 The empirical set-up investigates if a patent by an academic 
researcher is filed with a firm or the university as opposed to other types of ownership. The 
definition of firm and university is challenged here as university spin-offs could be 
considered either.  
As a researcher has the choice between two or more outcomes, their standard errors are not 
independent and require us to estimate them simultaneously, making it necessary to consider 
a bivariate model as opposed to a binary choice model. The bivariate probit estimator may be 
biased by self-selection into patenting. For example, researchers who receive less funding 
may also be less likely to patent. This would lead to an upward bias of the effect of funding 
 
14
 In fact we are looking at 244 patents; 23 patents have more than one inventor in the dataset. We consider 
these multiple counts of the same patent as explanatory variables differ across researchers. 
%Ownership can lie with the government or solely with an individual but these account for just 23 observations 
and are not included as separate categories.
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on patent ownership. To address this bias we include bivariate probit models that account for 
selection into patenting (see Supplement S4 for details). In these models the inventor’s 
academic publications, seniority, subject area and gender serve as exclusion restrictions as 
these variables have been found to be important predictors for patenting in previous research 
(e.g. Stephan et al., 2007). However, we do not expect them to influence the choice of a 
specific ownership form. The exclusion restrictions are supported as none of these variables 
significantly influence ownership if included in the second stage. The model is estimated with 
Maximum Simulated Likelihood Method using the GHK simulator (Gates, 2006).16  
Our estimation could further be biased by unobserved effects, e.g. specific skills that are 
necessary to source funding. If unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity is present, the 
estimated coefficient of the funding variables would be upwards biased. To control for such 
unobserved heterogeneity we follow Blundell et al. (2002), who suggest a solution which 
they call “feedback model”. The feedback model argues that the main source of unobserved 
heterogeneity lies in the different values of the dependent variable with which individuals 
enter the sample. This approach also helps to address the problem of endogeneity that arises 
from correlated individual effects and through feedback from the dependent variable. We 
therefore include a log of the pre-sample value, given by the number of patents filed between 
1998 and 2000, into the pooled models. For cases when the pre-sample value is zero a 
dummy is used to capture the “quasi-missing” value in log.  
While we have a panel set-up, some individuals may have more than one observation per year 
if they filed more than one patent. We include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at 
the individual level to mitigate this bias. We include several robustness checks to confirm the 
 
16
 We use the user-written command cmp in Stata to estimate the bivariate probit models with selection 
(Roodman, 2009). 
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consistency of our estimates, including, amongst others, a multinomial logit allowing for 
three ownership outcomes. 
4 Results 
Results are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 report the results of the first stage selection into 
patenting and columns 2 and 3 the second stage models for industry and university ownership. 
The Likelihood-Ratio tests of independent equations are rejected thus supporting our model 
choice.  
The second stage regression shows that the number of university spin-offs has no effect on 
patent ownership. However, it affects the selection into patenting indicating that researchers 
at universities with more spin-offs are more likely to patent. Conversely, outsourcing of IP 
protection has no effect on patenting propensity but a positive effect on university ownership. 
Concerning funding from industry, we find that funding coming from SMEs has a positive 
effect on university ownership but a negative effect on firm ownership of patents, while 
funding from large firms has the opposite effect. If in addition we consider the results from 
the selection model, we see that only sponsorship from large firms affects the overall 
propensity to patent, while funding from small firms has no effect. Public grants, on the other 
hand, are more likely to result in university owned patents while decreasing the overall 
propensity to patent.  
Past patenting experience is positively associated with the selection into patenting and with 
firm-ownership, but negatively with university ownership. Age only affects selection into 
patenting. Regarding the exclusion restrictions we find that publication intensity and seniority 
affect selection into patenting, while gender has no effect. Researchers in mechanical and 
civil engineering are less likely to select into patenting than their colleagues in electronics 
and chemical engineering (the omitted category). 
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S5 shows that the results hold when conflating multiple person-year observations into one 
observation, thus allowing for more overlap amongst the patent ownership variables. The 
most important differences we observe is that public grants no longer affect university 
ownership significantly and that funding from large firms turns insignificant in the firm-
ownership equation.  Results also largely hold if we exclude patents with multiple or other 
types of owners and estimate a univariate probit of university ownership with selection 
correction, but again only SME funding remains significant. 
As argued above, spin-off firms cannot be strictly considered firms but are often (partially) 
owned by the university, which profits from successful spin-off activity. We therefore 
investigate an alternative definition of university patents that includes patents of university 
spin-offs. The results in columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 show that coefficients of funding from 
large firms increase, indicating that the industry funding behind spin-off patents is more 
similar to that of university owned patents. However, the coefficients for public funding, 
SME funding and institutional variables decrease indicating that spin-off patents inhibit some 
characteristics that differ from other university patents. This is confirmed in the robustness 
regression in Supplement S5. 
As a last step we therefore look at the three types of patents in a multinomial logit, excluding 
all observations with zero patents and patents that are assigned to multiple owners or owned 
by none of the three categories, which reduces the number of observations to 237.17 The 
suest-based Hausman test shows that the null hypothesis of independent alternatives cannot 
be rejected and thus confirms that disturbances in the three categories are independent. To 
complement these results, we perform Likelihood-Ratio tests of combing alternatives in order 
to determine whether certain categories can be collapsed. This is rejected for all pairs of 
 
17
 A multivariate probit with selection was not possible as the model would not converge. As an alternative one 
could perform separate probit estimations and indeed the results are confirmed. The descriptive statistics for the 
reduced number of observations can be found in Supplement S5. 
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outcome categories. Again, we cluster standard errors on the individual inventor. The results 
show that spin-off patents do not differ from either of the other two categories significantly in 
any of our main variables of interest, with the exception of IP outsourcing. Thus, while we 
have been able to identify some differences between firm and university owned patents 
primarily with regard to sponsorship from SMEs, university spin-offs seem to share 
characteristics of both. This is further illustrated in Figure 1. 
 Factor Change Scale Relative to Category S
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Figure 1: Odds ratios and discrete changes relative to university spin-off (S) (Long and Freese, 2005)* 
*F=non-spin-off firm patent; S=spin-off patent; P=university patent 
 
In Supplement S5 we report results splitting public funding into funding received from 
research councils and charities on the one side and funding from government and the 
European Union (EU) on the other side to investigate if different types of public funding have 
different effects on ownership. The results show that the positive effect of public funding on 
university ownership is driven by research council and charity grants. In the multinomial logit 
we can further see that researchers receiving larger amounts of government and EU grants are 
more likely to file spin-off patents as compared to both the other two categories. Further the 
industry funding variables turn significant, indicating that the more funding researchers 
receive from large firms the more likely the patent will be assigned to an established firm 
rather than to a university spin-off, and the more funding is received from SMEs the more 
likely the patent will be assigned to the university rather than a spin-off or an established firm.  
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Table 2: Bivariate Probit with Selection and Multinomial Logit 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage Multinomial logit 
VARIABLES Patent University Firm Patent University/spin-off  Non-spin-off firm  SPIN/ UNIV 
FIRM/ 
UNIV 
FIRM/ 
SPIN 
         
ln_#spinoffit-1 0.138** -0.057 0.010 0.129** -0.023 0.000 -0.041 -0.031 0.011 
(0.055) (0.100) (0.129) (0.057) (0.120) (0.119) (0.031) (0.026) (0.033) 
patent_outsourcingi -0.068 0.419* -0.435 -0.064 0.185 -0.176 -2.031* -0.950 1.081 
(0.128) (0.222) (0.267) (0.129) (0.284) (0.300) (1.044) (0.620) (1.099) 
          
sme_fundingit-1 -0.042 0.161** -0.214*** -0.039 0.142* -0.198*** -0.575 -1.071** -0.496 
(0.031) (0.071) (0.060) (0.031) (0.073) (0.058) (0.353) (0.527) (0.579) 
largefirm_fundingit-1 0.031*** -0.034** 0.039** 0.030*** -0.040** 0.046** -0.037 0.037 0.073 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.022) (0.061) (0.064) (0.059) 
public_fundingit-1 -0.006* 0.008** -0.010** -0.005 0.008 -0.008 -0.015 -0.011 0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) 
          
ln_prepati 0.636*** -0.338* 0.470** 0.616*** -0.008 0.164 0.737 -0.246 -0.983** 
 (0.152) (0.190) (0.183) (0.155) (0.202) (0.188) (0.462) (0.412) (0.467) 
d_prepati -0.412** 0.688*** -0.706** -0.422** 0.431* -0.505* -1.243* -1.149* 0.094 
 (0.169) (0.249) (0.275) (0.169) (0.239) (0.258) (0.754) (0.587) (0.737) 
          
ageit 0.041** -0.057 0.024 0.037** -0.021 -0.024 0.109 -0.006 -0.115 
(0.018) (0.038) (0.035) (0.018) (0.036) (0.035) (0.113) (0.080) (0.119) 
ageit2 -0.001*** 0.001* -0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
avg_publicationit-1 0.048***   0.048***      
 (0.017)   (0.017)      
femalei -0.281  -0.320      
(0.267)  (0.274)      
profit 0.289**  0.251*      
(0.123)  (0.132)      
eleci 0.153  -0.356**      
(0.142)  (0.159)      
mech_civi -0.285*   0.166      
 (0.159)   (0.151)      
constant -1.934*** 1.306** -0.873 -1.868*** 1.081* -0.720 -0.483 1.609 2.091 
 (0.322) (0.550) (0.670) (0.321) (0.622) (0.671) (1.773) (1.233) (1.945) 
athrho_Firm_Univ -2.097*** -2.095***  
athrho_Firm_Pat 0.804** 0.643***  
athrho_Univ_Pat -0.978** -0.676***  
Observations (uncensored) 3278 (267) 3278 (267) 237 
Wald-chi 82.376*** 21.682* 66.54*** 
Log-Likelihood -955.963 -947.337 -217.820 
Pseudo-R_sq.   0.130 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by individual researcher (669). Coefficients are reported. Year dummies included in all models. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper investigated the patent ownership of university invented patents. Prior research in 
the field has shown that academics in Europe are inventors on a large number of patents that 
are not assigned to the academic’s institution but to a private firm or the academic herself 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Previous papers have argued that this may be due to appropriation 
norms that have allowed researchers or funding agents to maintain the rights to their 
inventions or due to universities’ difficulties in handling IPR. Changes in legislation and the 
continuing efforts of university administrations have led to a more rigid IPR regime for 
academic staff. However, even now the majority of university inventions are not assigned to 
the institution. For example, in the UK around 50% of university inventions are filed with a 
private firm and not the university (Sterzi, 2013).  
Using data on engineering academics in the UK, this paper investigated the drivers behind 
university and firm ownership of university invented patents. It differed between patents 
assigned to university spin-offs and patents assigned to other private firms and used 
information on university appropriation strategies and industry funding to shed light on the 
factors that drive firm ownership of patents. The first descriptive results showed that 27% of 
firms that own university invented patents are university spin-offs and account for 37% of 
firm-assigned patents. Thus, a major share of academic patents owned by industry are in fact 
owned by university spin-offs. Spin-off formation may thus present an alternative 
appropriation strategy of the university. 
Using bivariate probit models with selection correction we saw that funding from SMEs 
supports a university ownership model that includes university patents owned by the 
university and its spin-offs. Funding from large firms, on the other hand, supports an industry 
ownership model. This may indicate that universities are better able to enforce ownership 
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rights resulting from joint research with SMEs but that this enforcement is more difficult in 
joint research with large firms. Public funding is closer aligned with university ownership 
that does not include spin-off ownership. Spin-off companies seem to occupy an intermediate 
position between strict university ownership and strict industry ownership. Indeed the 
multinomial logit analysis confirms that the predictors of spin-off owned patents do not differ 
significantly from either of the other two ownership regimes.  
We further find that industry sponsorship and a strong spin-off strategy of the university 
encourage patenting. This indicates that contact with large firms and closeness to local start-
ups can be indicative of future appropriation of research.  
With regard to TTO management, one could argue that if university ownership is sought the 
bargaining position of researchers towards large firms needs to be strengthened. Universities 
that outsource their IP activities already seem more likely to keep their IP, perhaps due to a 
stronger bargaining position. On the other hand, large firms provide much greater funding 
than SMEs and universities may willingly forgo IP ownership in return for large research 
grants.  
Finally, while the results allow making inferences about the effect of university IPR regimes 
and industry sponsorship on patent ownership, the results cannot be interpreted as direct links. 
Instead, they are indicative of a culture in which the appropriation of knowledge is promoted 
and rewarded. The paper also shows that more research is needed to better explain ownership 
regimes, and that more diverse processes may be at work when decisions regarding 
appropriation of university research are made.  
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Supplements 
S1 – Sample Composition 
S2– Variable Description 
S3 – Correlation Matrix 
S4 – Methodological Note 
S5 – Robustness Tests 
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